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Phillips: Criminal Procedure - Improper Comment upon Post-Arrest Silence: W

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Improper Comment Upon Post-Arrest
Silence: Wyoming Returns to the Prejudicial Per Se Rule. Westmark
v. State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 1984).
In June 1983, after allegedly threatening a man at a public park with
a knife and hours later stabbing another man outside a restaurant, Michael
Westmark was charged with attempted second-degree murder, aggravated
assault and battery, and being a habitual criminal.1 At his arraignment,
Westmark pleaded not guilty to the three charges against him.2 The state
dismissed the habitual criminal count during the trial.3
At the trial, Westmark took the stand on his own behalf and testified
that the stabbing had occurred in self defense.4 During cross-examination,
the prosecutor and Westmark engaged in the following colloquy:
Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Westmark, that nobody has ever heard
this self defense story prior to your actually relating it for the first
time here in Court today?
A. Mr. Mealey.
Q. It's true that you never mentioned anything to the officers
at the time you were arrested, isn't it, regarding that?
A. That's true.
Q. Okay. Isn't it true that you never told any officers that
you stabbed anybody in self defense that night? True or false?
A. My attorney had advised me not to talk to the police officers concerning this matter.
Q. But, Mr. Westmark, you didn't have an attorney at the
time you were pulled over on the highway, did you?
A. No, sir, I didn't.
Q. In fact, the first time that story has been related to
anybody is right in this courtroom today; isn't it?
A. No, sir.5
During the state's case-in-chief, an exchange between the prosecutor and
police officer again brought Westmark's post-arrest silence to the jury's
attention:
Q. At that point, did the Defendant, or any time during the
course of your conversation with the Defendant, raise the issue
that he had been acting in self defense?
A. No. He didn't.
1. Brief for Appellee at 4-8, Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 1984). For

Westmark's account of the events leading to the charges, see Brief for Appellant at 3-6,
Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 1984) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
2. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.

3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at 8.

5. Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220, 221 (Wyo. 1984).
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Q. Did he ever mention self defense?
A. No. He didn't.6
During summation, the prosecutor for yet a third time brought to the
jury's attention Westmark's failure to inform the officers of his self defense
claim. He said, "If the defendant had, in fact, acted in self defense twice
within the past hour, why didn't he say so? He could have said, 'Yes, there
has been a stabbing and that guy attacked me.' "I
At trial, Westmark's counsel failed to object to either the prosecutor's
questioning or summation.8 After only one day's deliberation, the jury
returned a verdict finding Westmark guilty of both attempted seconddegree murder and assault and battery.9
On appeal, Westmark argued that the prosecutor's comments violated
his right to remain silent,'" as contained in the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution" and art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution." The Wyoming Supreme Court agreed, reversed the decision, and
sent the case back for a new trial.'3 In so doing, the court held that "any
comment upon the accused's exercise of his or her right to remain silent
is prejudicial error which will entitle the accused to a reversal of the
conviction."'

4

This holding overruled the harmless error doctrine embraced

by the court less than three years before in Richter v. State.'5
BACKGROUND

Federal
In Doyle v. Ohio,'6 state narcotics agents arrested two alleged marijuana dealers shortly after a purported sale to a narcotics bureau
informant." After being advised of their rights, both defendants chose
to remain silent.'8 The state tried the defendants separately,' 9 and each
defendant claimed at his trial that the narcotics bureau informant had
framed them both. 20 Their explanation, which the Supreme Court deemed
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 222.
9. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 7.
10. Westmark, 693 P.2d at 221. For a discussion of the right to remain silent in general
and the "right" not to have silence commented upon in particular, see Hackl, Silence Is No
Longer Golden: Destruction of the Right to Remain Silent, 19 LAND & WATER L. REV. 629
(1984).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides that "No person shall... be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself... "
12. WYo. CONST., art. 1, § 11 provides that "No person shall be compelled to testify
against himself in any criminal case ..
13. Westmark, 693 P.2d at 225.
14. Id. at 222.
15. 642 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1982).
16. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
17. Id. at 611.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 613.
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"not entirely implausible," presented problems for the prosecution, as no

2
evidence existed to contradict it. 1

Facing this troublesome testimony, the prosecutor commented on each
defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment right to remain silent, asking each defendant why he had not told the arresting agent about the
frame.22 Defense counsels' timely objections to this questioning were overruled, and the jury found each defendant guilty as charged.2 3 The appellate
court affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the prosecutor had elicited
the defendants' post-arrest silence only to inquire why they had not told
the same story at their first opportunity, and not to imply their guilt. The
24
Ohio Supreme Court denied further review.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the use of a defendant's post-arrest silence to impeach his
testimony violated any provision of the federal Constitution. 5 After finding an implicit assurance in the Miranda6 warnings that silence would
not carry a penalty,2 7 the Court held that use of the defendants' post-arrest,
post-Miranda warning silence to impeach their trial testimony was fundamentally unfair and deprived them of due process under the fourteenth
amendment. 28 The Court then stated that it would not consider whether
the error was harmless because the state had not asked that it do so. Yet
the Court's apparent willingness to treat such error as harmless, if asked
to do so, opened the door for other courts to do the same. 29
State
The Wyoming Supreme Court adopted Doyle in Irvin v. State.3 0 After
Irvin, but prior to Westmark v. State, it twice decided cases in which a
prosecutor commented on a defendant's post-arrest silence.
In Clenin v. State,3 the accused was arrested for delivery of a controlled substance. He remained silent after the arrest and at trial asserted
21. Id.

22. The prosecutor asked defendant Wood, "Mr. Wood, if that is all you had to do with
this and you are innocent, when Mr. Beamer arrived on the scene why didn't you tell him?"
Defendant Doyle was asked, "Why didn't you tell the police that Bill Bonnell just set you
up?" Id. at 614, 623.
23. Id. at 614.
24. Id. at 615-16.
25. Id.
26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
27. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618.
28. Id at 619. Though post-arrest, pre-Mirandawarning silence may be commented
upon without violating the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution, Fletcher v.
Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982), it may not be commented upon under Wyo. CONST., art. 1, § 11.
Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1978), dictates that the right to remain silent does
not depend on the accused's being advised of that right, but exists by virtue of the constitutional language. Advice as to that right serves only to expand its protection by assuring
that the accused person is aware of it.
29. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619-20. Harmless error is error that is not prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the party assigning it, and in no way affects the final outcome of the
case. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, 646 (5th ed. 1979).
30. 560 P.2d 372, 373 (Wyo. 1977).
31. 573 P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1978).
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an alibi.32 While cross-examining Clenin, the prosecutor commented upon
his failure to inform either the arresting officer or the prosecutor's office
of the alibi. 3 After an objection, the court halted this line of questioning,4
but did not grant a mistrial. The jury found Clenin guilty as charged.
Facing a possible reversal on appeal for prejudicial comment, the state
argued that the Supreme Court's construction of the fifth amendment in
Doyle permitted the Wyoming Supreme Court to find that the prosecutor's
remarks constituted harmless error under the federal standard.35 The court
agreed, but determined that Wyoming's strong tradition of jealously
guarding the right to remain silent from encroachments required a different construction of art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution. Accordingly, the court held that any comment upon an accused's silence was both
per se, and entitled an accused to a reversal
plain error and prejudicial
3 7
of his conviction.

Less than five years later, in Richter v. State, the court overruled
Clenin and its prejudicial per se rule. The defendant in Richter was charged
with first-degree sexual assault. After being arrested, he remained silent.
At trial, he raised a defense of sexual inability, and on cross-examination
38
the prosecutor responded by commenting upon his post-arrest silence.
Again the court considered applying the harmless error doctrine, and this
time did3 9so, reasoning that Clenin's prejudicial per se rule swept too
broadly.
The court abandoned Clenin because, in its view, the reversal of
criminal convictions due to clearly harmless error exacted an unsustainable
toll on the legal system. 4 This unsustainable toll was said to arise from
both the expenses to counties from new trials and the loss of public conthe legal system's ability to do justice and protect law-abiding
fidence in
41
citizens.
32. Id.

33. Id. at 845. The prosecutor asked the defendant, "Well, when you were arrested
though, didn't you say, look it [sic], this couldn't be me, I was at a party?"
34. Id. at 844.
35. Id. at 846.
36. Id The Wyoming Supreme Court may interpret the Wyoming Constitution more
favorably to a defendant than the United States Supreme Court has done under the United
States Constitution. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); State v. Santiago, 53
Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
37. Clenin, 573 P.2d at 846. See Jones v. State, 200 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967);
Commonwealth v. Easley, 483 Pa. 337, 396 A.2d 1198 (1979).

38. Id at 1272. The prosecutor asked Richter, "Did you volunteer this version to the
deputies at the time you walked behind the truck?" Justice Thomas argued that this question referred to pre-arrest silence as in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), and thus
did not constitute error. Even assuming the question did refer to pre-arrest silence, Justice
Thomas is mistaken that there would not be error. The reason there was no error in Jenkins
was that such comment was not protected under the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution, and the comment was not fundamentally unfair since the accused had not been
governmentally induced to remain silent through Mirandawarnings. In Wyoming, such comment is prohibited not as a violation of due process, but as a violation of his right not to
be compelled to testify against himself. Consequently, the Jenkins analysis does not apply.

39. Richter, 642 P.2d at 1273.
40. Id
41. Id. at 1275.
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For error to be deemed harmless under the rule enunciated in Richter,
three conditions must be met: (1)there cannot be more than one comment
on the defendant's silence at trial, (2) the comment must be ambiguous,
and (3) the evidence of guilt must be overwhelming. "42 Although the court
did not give a definitive test for ambiguity, it mentioned such contributing
factors as whether an objection was immediately made and sustained,
whether the jury heard the response to the improper question, whether
the court directed the jurors to disregard the question, whether the ques43
tion was mentioned again, and whether the state exploited the silence.
Westmark thus came before a court that had long required automatic
reversal for comment on post-arrest silence, but had recently departed
from that practice by adopting the harmless error rule to such comment.
Westmark gave the Wyoming Supreme Court its first opportunity to
evaluate the harmless error rule since it was adopted in Richter v. State.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

Because Westmark did not object to the prosecutor's comments upon
his post-arrest silence, his appeal came before the Wyoming Supreme
Court under the plain error doctrine." The plain error doctrine provides
the error
that the court may recognize error not objected to at trial when
4
is obvious and affects substantial rights of the accused. Under this
assignment of error, the court must first determine whether the questioning and summation constitute error. If the court finds error, 4it must then
determine whether the error rises to the level of plain error. 1 If plain error is found, the court must then determine whether it was prejudicial
or harmless.
Error
To show how powerful and deeply rooted the right to remain silent
has been regarded in Wyoming, the court cited its previous decisions in
Gabrielson v. State47 and Jerskey v. State.48 In Gabrielson,the court stated
that no constitutional right of an accused is more sacred than his right
to remain silent and branded any comment upon silence "highly
improper.'

49

The Westmark court then extracted from Jerskey the prin-

ciple that it is error to use an accused's silence against him at trial unless
he clearly, unmistakably, and knowledgeably waives his constitutional
right to remain silent.50
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Westmark, 693 P.2d at 222.

45. Id. Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 49(b) and Wyo. R. App. P. 7.05 read: "Plain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention
of the court."
46. Westmark, 693 P.2d at 222.

47. 510 P.2d 534 (Wyo. 1973).
48. 546 P.2d 173 (Wyo. 1976).
49. Gabrielson, 510 P.2d at 538.
50. Westmark, 693 P.2d at 223.
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The court also relied on Gabrielsonand Jerskey to explain Wyoming's
pre-Richtertradition of automatically reversing convictions blemished by
prosecutorial comment upon post-arrest silence. Reasoning that such comment penalized a constitutional right under the fifth amendment, 5 the
Gabrielson court warned that a constitutional guarantee becomes barren
and valueless when its exercise is used to the accused's detriment. The
unacceptable result of such a penalty, one justice concluded, is
an unde5
niable chilling effect on the use of constitutional guarantees. 1
The Jerskey court also explained its refusal to tolerate dilution of constitutional rights such as the right to remain silent. Its objection rested
on ancient tendencies whereby those with the power of government seek
to impose their will upon the governed." Less than strict adherence to
constitutional rights, the court proclaimed, allows "[tihe fragile cobwebs
of human rights [to] become misty visions which tend to blend with the
ghosts of some public official's private opinion of what is 'good,' 'fair,'
'right,' and 'just' until they become imperceptible and - at last - are
4
no rights at all."1

The Westmark court was persuaded by the strong tradition against
comment upon post-arrest silence and the reasons for that tradition. As
a result, it found such comment to be error. This finding was consistent
with every other Wyoming decision that had considered the question, including Richter v. State.
Plain Error
Having found that the prosecutor's questioning and summation constituted error, the court then needed to determine if the plain error doctrine applied. When an appellant seeks review under the plain error doctrine, he must establish: (1) that the record clearly and unequivocally
reflects the fact complained of; (2) that the facts prove a transgression
of a clear rule of law; (3) that the error affects a substantial right of the
accused; and (4) that the defendant has been materially prejudiced by that
violation.55
In Westmark, the fact complained of was comment upon Westmark's
post-arrest silence. The court found this in the record. The court also found
that the comment transgressed both the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution and art. 1, § 11, of the Wyoming Constitution, and
51. Gabrielson, 510 P.2d at 538.
52. 1& at 539-40 (Guthrie, J., concurring).
53. Jerskey, 546 P.2d at 177.

54. Id.
55. Westmark, 693 P.2d at 224. See, e.g., Britton v. State, 643 P.2d 935, 937 (Wyo.
1982); Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Wyo. 1981). The court was incorrect in concluding that the prosecutor's comments violated the fifth amendment of the federal Constitution. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619. Cf. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980)
(The Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, is
not violated by the use of pre-arrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility);
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (The use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda warning silence
when a defendant chooses to take the stand does not violate either the fifth or fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution).
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thereby affected Westmark's right to remain silent.56 Thus, to apply the
plain error rule, the court needed only to establish that the comment
materially prejudiced Westmark.
Prejudicial Versus Harmless Error
The error in Westmark was not harmless. More than one comment
was made at trial regarding post-arrest silence. The comments made were
not ambiguous, and to at least one justice the evidence of guilt was not
overwhelming." Thus, the court could have found prejudicial error without
overruling Richter v. State and its harmless error rule.
Yet in determining whether the prosecutor's comments were prejudicial, the court did not even consider whether they qualified as harmless
error. Instead, it found prejudicial error by embracing its previous holding
in Clenin. In that case, the court held that any comment upon the accused's
exercise of his right to remain silent is both plain error and prejudicial
per se, and entitles an accused to reversal of his conviction. 8
The court abandoned Richter's harmless error rule because of prosecutorial abuse. It stated that it had become aware of far too many instances in which prosecutors were knowingly violating an accused's constitutional rights by commenting upon his post-arrest silence, believing
that the court would hold the resulting error harmless. 59 The court returned
to Clenin's prejudicial per se rule to stop such flagrant violations of constitutional rights. 60
ANALYSIS

Abuse of the Harmless ErrorRule and the Consequences
The purpose of Clenin's prejudicial per se rule was to deter prosecutors
from commenting upon an accused's post-arrest silence. When Richter
abandoned the prejudicial per se rule in favor of the harmless error rule,
it did away not only with automatic reversal, but also with deterrence.
This created an overwhelming and continuing temptation for prosecutors
to test the court's limits of harmless error. 6' Such a system is ripe for
abuse, and 2 Westmark found that prosecutors were yielding to the
temptation.
The harmless error rule is also susceptible to abuse because of its subjective nature. The rule is subjective in its entirety in that overwhelming
evidence turns out to be whatever three members of the court believe it
to be in any given instance.6 3 To demonstrate the inherent uncertainty
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Westmark, 693 P.2d at 226 (Brown, J., concurring).
Clenin, 573 P.2d at 846.
Westmark, 693 P.2d at 221-22.
Id at 222.
Richter, 642 P.2d at 1286.
Westmark, 693 P.2d at 221-22.
Richter v. State, 642 P.2d 1269, 1279 (Wyo. 1976) (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
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of what constituted harmless error, Justice Thomas confessed that he
could not identify the differentiating factors between Browder v. State,64
a close case, and Richter v. State, an overwhelming case.6 5 When Justice
Thomas is this uncertain about what makes error harmless, it is understandable that prosecutors will also be uncertain. It is not surprising that
in the heat of a trial a prosecutor will give himself the benefit of the doubt
and conclude that the error will be harmless.
By allowing convictions to stand when the error was clearly harmless,
Richter's harmless error rule promised both to save counties money from
new trials and to increase public confidence in the legal system's ability
to do justice and protect law-abiding citizens.6 6 These noble aims collapse
when prosecutors abuse the harmless error rule. Such abuse forces the
court to choose between two undesirable alternatives. The court can allow
the comment as harmless error. But if the court does this, prosecutors
will become more bold with their comments, and eventually the resulting
error will become too grievous to be sustained. The court will then have
to exercise the second alternative and reverse the decision. At this point
the harmless error rule becomes responsible for creating the problems it
was designed to eliminate-the county is burdened with the expense of
a new trial, and the public loses confidence in the legal system.
Apart from creating the problems it was designed to eliminate, the
harmless error rule, when combined with prosecutorial abuse, potentially
produces two undesirable results. First, a defendant who would not have
been convicted in a fair trial may be convicted solely on the basis of improper prosecutorial comment. A reversal of his conviction on appeal does
not completely exonerate him. Second, convictions that could have been
obtained and upheld without the improper prosecutorial comment might
properly be reversed because of the comment. Such a result does not serve
the interest of judicial economy. To minimize these dangers, it is necessary
to make it clear to prosecutors that such comments are prejudicial per
se. Only then will prosecutors be deterred from obtaining convictions by
improper comment.
Comment and the Probative Value-PrejudicialImpact Test
Before any comment upon an accused's post-arrest silence may be
allowed into evidence, the court must find that the probative value of the
comment is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudicial impact.6 For an accused's post-arrest silence to be deemed probative of the untruthfulness of his exculpatory testimony at trial, the prosecution must establish an inconsistency between the post-arrest silence
64. 639 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1982).
65. Richter, 642 P.2d at 1279-80 (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
66. Id at 1275.
67. Wyo. R. EvI. 403 reads: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
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and the exculpatory testimony at trial. 68 Westmark's testimony presented
neither inconsistency nor significant probative value. An arrestee whether innocent or guilty - may remain silent for many reasons that
are unrelated to culpability, including the intimidating situation at the
time of arrest, the emotional and confusing circumstances at the time of
arrest, the hostile and perhaps unfamiliar atmosphere surrounding his
detention, fear or unwillingness to incriminate another, or an exercise of
his right to remain silent. 69
Even if a court finds some degree of probative value in post-arrest
silence, that value is dwarfed by the significant potential for unfair prejudice. Unfair prejudicial impact arises from the jury's inclination to assign
too much weight to the defendant's post-arrest silence. Even if an accused
is allowed to explain his reasons for remaining silent, it is unlikely that
he will overcome the strong negative inference the jury draws from this
70
silence.
Clenin's Truly Harmless ErrorRule
To come within Clenin's rule of prejudice per se, the prosecutor's
reference to silence must rise to the level of comment.7 ' For reference to
silence to be classified as comment, prejudice must first be shown.7 1 When
the mention of silence does not compel the defendant to testify against
himself, and when it does not contain even an innuendo that the defendant was making any claim of right to silence, no element of coercion ex73
ists and no inference of guilt can be drawn from the defendant's response.
In these circumstances of truly harmless error, a decision will not be
reversed in Wyoming.
CONCLUSION

In Westmark, the Wyoming Supreme Court returned to its long tradition of holding that comment upon an accused's post-arrest silence at trial
requires a reversal. Prosecutorial abuse, arising from both the lack of deterrence and the subjective nature of harmless error, caused the harmless
error rule to create the problems it was designed to correct. To avoid this
anomalous result, the court acted wisely in reinstating the prejudicial per
se rule to comment upon post-arrest silence.
GREGORY

A.

PHILLIPS

68. UNITED STATES V. HALE, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975).
69. Id. at 177.
70. Id. at 180.
71. Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1381-82 (Wyo. 1981). See Hughes v. State, 658
P.2d 1294 (Wyo. 1983).
72. Parkhurst,628 P.2d at 1382.
73. Id. at 1381.
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